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ENFORCE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
SCOTT D. MIKKELSEN* 
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”—U.S. Constitution, Amendment V. 
Governments, both state and federal, have the right to take 
private property for public use, provided that just compensation is 
paid.1 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution sets the legal 
standard for these propositions—this power is known as the right of 
eminent domain.2 In the landmark decision, Kelo v. City of New 
London,3 the Supreme Court held that the taking of a citizen’s private 
property for economic development qualified as a public use within 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.4 Several scholars, legislatures, 
and individuals, have objected to Kelo’s extension of the power of 
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 1. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 n. 1. Governments are prohibited 
from taking private property without paying for it by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. Id. (citing Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). However, 
this does not appear strictly correct, since the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does 
not refer either to takings or to compensation, and the manner by which the just compensation 
and public use requirement is imposed on the states must be derived from the definition of due 
process. See JOHN NOWAK AND RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §11.11, 426 (4th 
ed. 1991)). 
 2. Nothing in the Constitution explicitly confers this eminent domain power upon either 
the federal or state governments. But the Fifth Amendment, originally intended to apply solely 
to the federal government, provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.” Therefore the Taking Clause is at least a “tacit recognition that the 
power to take private property exists.” United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241 (1946). 
 3. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor noted that 
States play many important functions in our system of dual sovereignty, but compensating for 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to properly enforce the Federal Constitution is not among them. 
 4. Id. at 2656–58. 
 12 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR VOL. 2:11 
 
eminent domain5 because the ruling has extended the government’s 
power of eminent domain to areas once thought unimaginable.6 
Instead of critiquing the merits of the majority’s decision, this 
commentary will focus on practical applications in a post-Kelo world. 
Its purpose is twofold: first, to serve as a guide to individuals and state 
legislators assessing what the Kelo decision says, and second, to assist 
all individuals attempting to meaningfully protect their Fifth 
Amendment rights post-Kelo. Part I is a guide to the facts of the Kelo 
case. An understanding of the Kelo facts will allow practitioners to 
compare or distinguish future property rights and eminent domain 
cases. Following the facts section, Part II covers the legal framework 
of the Kelo decision by discussing and analyzing two prior eminent 
domain cases relied upon by the Kelo majority and providing an 
explanation for the Court’s ultimate expansion of eminent domain 
power. Finally, Part III offers suggestions for post-Kelo actions for 
which individuals can lobby and legislators can follow to ensure 
protection of their constituents’ Fifth Amendment rights. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF KELO V. NEW LONDON 
By the early 1990’s, the City of New London, Connecticut, already 
had experienced decades of economic decline.7 By 1998, the city 
witnessed an unemployment rate nearly double that of the rest of the 
state, and harbored a dwindling population of just under 24,000 
residents, its lowest since 1920.8 These conditions prompted state and 
local officials to target New London, particularly its Fort Trumbull 
 
 5. Similarly, I disagree with the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo. The decision ignored 
one of the primary purposes of government, to uphold the clearly defined rights of the people, 
including the Fifth Amendment’s private property rights. I believe that the Court lost sight of 
this primary function by focusing too narrowly on the language from two earlier eminent 
domain cases. Regardless, the primary goal of this commentary is not to serve as a theoretical 
critique on why the Court was wrong. Many pieces have done that, and perhaps Justice 
O’Connor’s and Justice Thomas’ dissents offer the best explanations of the faulty logic 
employed by the Kelo majority. 
 6. See Grassroots Groundswell Grows Against Eminent Domain Abuse, 
http://www.ij.org/private_property/connecticut/7_12_05pr.html (last visited May 5, 2006); see 
also Eminent Domain Hits the Links, WALL ST. J. EDITORIAL PAGE, Mar. 28, 2006 (the Mayor 
of North Hills, New York, said he wants to use powers of eminent domain to turn an elite 
private golf course into an elite municipal course, stating, “[it] would be a wonderful amenity for 
the people of the village”). 
 7. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658. 
 8. Id. 
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area, for economic revitalization.9 To help accomplish economic 
revitalization, the New London City Government reactivated the 
New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit 
entity. In January of 1998, the Connecticut legislature authorized $15 
million in bonds to help fund both NLDC’s planning and the creation 
of Fort Trumbull State Park.10 
In February 1998, Pfizer Inc., the pharmaceuticals manufacturer, 
announced that it would build a global research facility near the Fort 
Trumbull State Park and the Fort Trumbull residential 
neighborhood.11 Two months later, the New London City Council gave 
initial approval for the NLDC to prepare the development plan, 
which later became the subject matter of the Kelo lawsuit.12 The 
development plan provided for the development of ninety acres of 
the Fort Trumbull neighborhood, which would complement the 
facility Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, and increase tax and 
other revenues.13 
The following developments were planned: eighty to one-hundred 
new residences; a resort hotel and conference center; a new state park; 
and retail, research, and office space.14 The plan divided the area into 
seven parcels, but did not specify the exact plans for development in 
any but the first parcel (the resort and hotel conference center).15 In 
2000, the City approved the development plan and authorized the 
corporation to begin acquiring land in the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood.16 
The Fort Trumbull neighborhood was composed of 115 residential 
and commercial lots, which the NLDC offered to buy. When the 
owners of fifteen of the properties did not wish to sell, the City of 
New London moved to acquire the properties by eminent domain.17 
The homeowners in question owned properties in a total of just two 
of the plan’s seven parcels, Parcel 3 and Parcel 4A.18 Further, the 
 
 9. Id. at 2658–59. 
 10. Id. at 2659. 
 11. Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. (noting that the NLDC was not elected by popular vote, and its directors and 
employees were privately appointed). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 2659 (majority opinion). 
 15. Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 2671–72. 
 18. Id. 
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development plan only called for nominal use of these parcels—for 
instance, Parcel 3 was slated for construction of research and office 
space as the market progressed for such space, and Parcel 4A was 
slated for park support.19 
In response to the City’s efforts, nine of the homeowners sued the 
City of New London and the NLDC to save their homes.20 The owners 
maintained that the United States Constitution prohibited the NLDC 
from condemning their properties for the sake of economic 
development, arguing that such development by private developers 
was not a public use under the Fifth Amendment.21 At oral argument, 
lawyers for the city noted the city’s proposed use for Parcels 3 and 4A 
was vague, and may be used merely as parking facilities.22 Despite an 
ill defined and unclear conceptualized public use, the city’s argument 
in favor of public use succeeded.23 
II.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE KELO CASE 
The legal outcome of the Kelo case turned on the question of 
whether New London’s economic development plan qualified as a 
public use or served a public purpose.24 In Kelo, the Court began by 
clarifying two established and opposite public use propositions.25 First, 
it was established that a state or local government could not take the 
private property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another 
private party B, even if A was paid just compensation for the 
property.26 On the other hand, it was equally clear that a state could 
transfer property from one private party to another if future use by 
the public was the purpose of the taking.27 The condemnation of land 
for a railroad with common-carrier duties is an example of a public-
use taking. Another example is the condemnation of property used 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 2672. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 2663 (majority opinion). The question of whether public purpose is equivalent to 
public use is debatable, but in Kelo, a majority of the Court treated the two terms as 
synonymous. At least Justice Thomas disagreed. Id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 2661 (majority opinion). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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for utility lines or irrigation ditches, all of which are shared by the 
public.28 
A. The Berman and Midkiff Cases 
Kelo was the first major case the Supreme Court heard involving 
the taking of real property by eminent domain since 1984, and only 
the second since 1954. Therefore, only two cases from the past fifty 
years helped guide the Court in confronting a case that fell 
somewhere between the two bedrock principles mentioned above.29 In 
order to understand Kelo, it is important to understand these two 
decisions. 
In 1954, the Supreme Court upheld a redevelopment plan as being 
a public use in Berman v. Parker.30 Berman involved a blighted area of 
Washington, D.C. in which over half of the housing for the area’s 
5,000 inhabitants was beyond repair, and was a threat to public health 
and safety.31 The government’s response was to pass the 1945 District 
of Columbia Redevelopment Act. Under section 2 of that Act, 
Congress declared it the policy of the United States to eliminate all 
substandard housing in Washington, D.C. because such areas were 
injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.32 Under 
Congress’s plan, the area would be condemned and property taken 
through the use of eminent domain so that part of it could be utilized 
for the construction of streets, schools, and other public facilities.33 An 
owner of a department store located in the blighted area challenged 
the condemnation as an invalid public use on two grounds: first, his 
property was commercial and not residential or slum housing, and 
second, his property was being condemned for sale to a private 
agency for redevelopment.34 
 
 28. Id. at 2661–64. 
 29. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the Hawaiian 
legislature validly exercised its power of eminent domain by taking private property and 
granting it to non-landowners, and that such a taking did not violate the public use doctrine); 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that a congressional act condemning blighted 
areas in Washington, D.C. and taking them for redevelopment purposes was a valid public use). 
 30. Berman, 348 U.S. 26. 
 31. Id. The neighborhood in question had deteriorated from urban blight to the point that 
sixty-five percent of the dwellings were beyond repair. 
 32. NOWAK, supra note 1, at §11.13. 
 33. Berman, 348 U.S. 26. 
 34. Id. 
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Ultimately the Berman case concerned the constitutionality of the 
Act, and the use of eminent domain by Congress.35 A unanimous 
Court upheld the Act. It held that once the legislature had determined 
that the use of eminent domain was for a public use, the role of the 
courts in reviewing the legislature’s judgment was extremely narrow.36 
Thirty years later, in 1984, the Court upheld another eminent 
domain case involving the taking of private property in Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff.37 Again, deference to the legislature was 
involved in the Court’s reasoning. The Midkiff case involved a scheme 
arranged by the Hawaii legislature whereby Hawaii used its eminent 
domain power to acquire lots owned by large landowners, and then 
transferred the lots to the tenants living on them or to other non-
landowners.38 The facts of the Midkiff case were unusual because of 
the tremendous inequality in land ownership in Hawaii.39 For instance, 
on the island of Oahu, twenty-two landowners owned 75.5% of the 
privately-owned land, forcing thousands of homeowners to lease 
rather than to buy the land under their homes.40 
These circumstances helped promote social inequality and 
generated social unrest.41 By redistributing the property, the problems 
attributed to the land oligopoly and deficiencies in the real estate 
market could be corrected and a majority of the public would tangibly 
and directly benefit from the legislation.42 Importantly, because the 
scheme was a rational attempt to remedy a social evil, or correct a 
public harm, the Court held that it qualified as a public use.43 In 
explaining its decision, the Midkiff Court mentioned the need to give 
legislatures broad latitude to determine what public needs justify the 
use of the takings power.44 
 
 35. NOWAK, supra note 1, at §11.13. 
 36. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32–33. 
 37. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 38. Id. at 233–34. 
 39. Id. at 233. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id at 241 (noting the Hawaiian legislature’s observation that the state’s land 
oligopoly created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the market, and thus, 
inequality of ownership). 
 42. NOWAK, supra note 1, at §11.13. 
 43. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–43. 
 44. Id. at 244–45; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (upholding 
Midkiff). 
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B. The Kelo Decision 
Relying heavily on Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that 
the economic development involved in Kelo v. City of New London 
constituted a public use under both the Connecticut State 
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.45 The United States Supreme 
Court affirmed in a 5-4 decision led by Justice Stevens.46 Early in the 
opinion, Justice Stevens turned to Berman and Midkiff and made it 
clear that the Supreme Court granted great deference to legislatures 
in determining which public needs justified the use of eminent 
domain.47 One unifying theme among these three cases is the general 
application of deference to state governments, and the evolution of 
this deference. 
Although Berman and Midkiff deferred to the states to determine 
what constitutes public use, Kelo represents the first time the Court 
used deference to avoid the constitutional question completely. 
Instead, the Court turned deference to legislative judgment into a 
threshold question. Thus, the majority gave a disappointing cursory 
review to whether the economic development in Kelo qualified as a 
public use under the Fifth Amendment.48 The majority took the 
position that no principled way existed of distinguishing the Kelo 
economic development from the public purposes recognized in 
Berman and Midkiff.49 Such a position only left the possibility to grant 
the legislature deference and rely on its judgment prior judgment 
regarding the taking. 
Although the Kelo Court articulated a deferential position to state 
governments, the majority also noted three factors that limited its 
scope of review over the City of New London’s taking.50 These factors 
could be important, as they may not be present in all takings cases. 
 
 45. Brett Talley, Restraining Eminent Domain Through Just Compensation: Kelo v. City of 
New London, 29 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 761 (2006). 
 46. Kelo 125 S. Ct. at 2669. 
 47. Id. at 2664. It is puzzling that Justice Stevens felt the Fifth Amendment was an area for 
strong federalist protection to apply. If the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution is to apply 
equally to State governments, it would seem the Federal government would have to be willing 
to uphold it against State governments. 
 48. Justice Kennedy was the fifth and deciding vote. He concurred in the judgment, but 
reserved the right to strike down takings that benefit a particular party with only incidental or 
pretextual public benefits. Of the four dissenting justices, two wrote separate opinions. 
 49. Id. at 2665; Talley, supra note 45, at 761. 
 50. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665. 
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First, New London had invoked a state statute that specifically 
authorized the use of eminent domain to promote economic 
development.51 Second, the statue was comprehensive in character.52 
Third, the statute had been thoroughly deliberated preceding its 
adoption.53 The absence of these factors may be one way to distinguish 
future cases from Kelo. 
The dissent, written by Justice O’Connor and joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, distinguished Kelo from Berman and 
Midkiff, pointing out that both cases involved takings that were 
effected to remedy extraordinary situations that had inflicted 
affirmative harm to the public.54 There was no infliction of affirmative 
harm occurring in New London, however, and by authorizing the 
condemnation of well maintained property for the sole purpose of 
generating economic development the dissent stated that, “the Court 
has so greatly expanded the definition of public use that it now 
includes virtually all exercises of eminent domain.”55 Further, the 
dissent pointed out that nearly all takings benefit the public in some 
way.56 Because large private companies could use private property in a 
more lucrative way, the majority’s reasoning would create a standard 
under which no private property would be truly safe.57 
Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He 
agreed with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in that by approving 
economic development as a public use, the Court was effectively 
removing any constitutional impediment to the use of eminent 
domain.58 Justice Thomas went further, however, and encouraged 
revisiting the Public Use Clause cases and returning to the original 
meaning of the Public Use Clause: that the government may take 
property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use 
the property.59 
The other fundamental position and critical distinction Justice 
Thomas highlighted was the Court’s confusion and error in equating 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 2674 –75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Talley, supra note 45, at 763. 
 55. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674–75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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the power of eminent domain with the police power of the States.60 
Justice Thomas traced this confusion to the following statement the 
Supreme Court made in the Midkiff decision: “the public use 
requirement is conterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police 
powers.”61 Justice Thomas pointed out that these two powers are not 
the same. For example, traditional uses of the police or regulatory 
power of States, such as the power to abate a nuisance, does not 
require compensation, as does the use of eminent domain.62 
Whether a State can take private property using the power of 
eminent domain, Justice Thomas argued, is distinct from the question 
of whether it can regulate property pursuant to the police power.63 
Even Berman would have been decided on different grounds had 
these distinct lines been drawn.64 Under Thomas’s view, if the slums in 
Berman were truly blighted, then the state nuisance laws, not the 
power of eminent domain, should have provided the appropriate 
remedy.65 
Despite the dissents, the Kelo decision presently affirms the use of 
eminent domain for economic development. Thus, we arrive at the 
best way to proceed post-Kelo. 
III. WHAT ACTION TO TAKE POST KELO 
After the Kelo v. City of New London decision, it has become 
clear that the protection of the Fifth Amendment is now in the hands 
of state governments.66 The Supreme Court itself has clearly stated 
that federal courts will defer to state legislatures in their 
determination of what constitutes a public use in the area of eminent 
domain.67 This is the common thread linking fifty years of Court 
jurisprudence, stretching from the Berman decision to the Kelo 
 
 60. Id. at 2685. This was also a concern Justice O’Connor shared at some level. See Talley, 
supra note 45, at 763. 
 61. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 
U.S. 229, 240 (1984). 
 62. Kelo, 125 S.Ct at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (majority opnion) (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion 
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”). 
 67. Id.; Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244–45 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954). 
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decision.68 The seminal event was reached in Kelo, when the majority 
instructed states to strengthen their own property rights if they were 
dissatisfied with the decision.69 Now, a proper legislative response 
should consider three things: (1) clearly defining the difference 
between a state’s regulatory or police power, and its eminent domain 
power; (2) clearly defining what qualifies as a public use under 
eminent domain; and (3) creating a property rights ombudsman 
office.70 
A. Clearly Define the Difference Between State Regulatory Power 
and State Eminent Domain Power 
One of the most important steps a legislature can take to 
compensate for the Kelo v. City of New London decision is to draft 
legislation that makes clear the distinction between its state’s 
regulatory or police power, and its eminent domain power. The 
purpose of the police power is to secure rights by prohibiting harms,71 
while the purpose of the eminent domain power is to provide public 
goods by taking private property, but only after paying the owner just 
compensation.72 Therefore, it may be said that the state takes property 
by eminent domain when it is useful to the public, and the state takes 
property under the police power when it is harmful.73 Thus, a 
legislature may clarify that its state’s police power will be used to 
solve nuisance-type problems and prohibit harms, and reserve 
eminent domain power to situations that provide a public use or 
public good.74 
Circumstances that fit into neither a state’s police power nor 
eminent domain power should be reserved for the individual.75 This is 
an important and balanced provision, as it keeps individual property 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 70. An ombudsman is an official of government who assists citizens in resolving disputes 
with the government. 
 71. Steven Eagle, The Birth of the Property Rights Movement, THE CATO INSTITUTE, 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa404.pdf (last visited May 5, 2006). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (quoting Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights 
(Buffalo, N.Y.: William S. Hein, 1904), § 511. Quoted in Zev Trachtenberg, “Introduction: How 
Can Property Be Political?” 304 OKLA. L. REV. 50 (1997)). 
 74. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that such a distinction 
would mean that the Berman decision would have been decided on different grounds). 
 75. Id. at 2680. 
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owner’s rights intact, while still allowing municipalities to fight 
problems that create public harms.76 Cities, states, and legislators have 
many options when confronting eminent domain issues, and they 
represent a large continuum of responses, many of which need not 
trample individual property rights to be successful. 
In this regard, it is important for legislators and advocates to not 
engage in a debate that sets up a false dichotomy between economic 
development and strong property rights. For evidence of this 
proposition, it is worth examining the City of Anaheim, California.77 
Anaheim’s old downtown had been obliterated in the 1970s by 
eminent domain for urban renewal, which was unsuccessful and costly 
to the taxpayers.78 When recently faced with economic and city 
redevelopment, instead of trying eminent domain again, the city 
pursued deregulation.79 By forming an overlay zone that removed 
zoning restrictions and allowed almost any imaginable use of the 
downtown property, the city created a land value premium in the 
dilapidated area. Because owners could suddenly sell to a wider range 
of buyers, the area boomed, resulting in the investment of billions of 
dollars. In short, Anaheim succeeded in protecting property rights by 
deregulating land uses and promoting competition.80 
B. Clearly Define What Qualifies as a Public Use or Purpose 
Second, a proper legislative response should clearly define what 
qualifies as a public use. There are only two constitutional 
requirements for the exercise of eminent domain power: that the use 
be public, and that the owner receive just compensation.81 The most 
straightforward manner in which to compensate for the Kelo v. City of 
New London decision is to draft legislation that clearly explains that 
economic development does not constitute a public use in a state. 
 
 76. It is important to note, however, that the use of regulatory power usually does not 
require the state to compensate individuals to remove a nuisance; consider if you want to 
compensate such individuals in your state. 
 77. The Anti-Kelo, WALL ST. J. EDITORIAL PAGE, Apr. 6, 2006. 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/cc/?id=110008189 (last visited May 5, 2006). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Talley, supra note 45, at 759. 
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C. Consider Establishing Ombudsman Offices 
Finally, a proper legislative response to Kelo v. City of New 
London would be to establish a property-rights ombudsman office 
within your state. A property-rights ombudsman office could be 
available to individuals when they are confronting a condemnation by 
the government and trying to assess whether the government’s 
proposed use fits the definition of a public use, or whether the 
government’s valuation of its property is fair and accurate.82 An 
ombudsman could also encourage state and local government 
agencies to regulate and acquire land in a manner that is consistent 
with applicable statutes and laws. 
An ombudsman office is important because the burden of 
eminent domain falls disproportionately on the poor, and the poor are 
the least likely to be able to afford legal assistance.83 This is especially 
true when individuals want to contest whether a proposed eminent 
domain action fits the definition of a public use, because there is no 
guaranteed monetary value to attract legal assistance on a contingent 
fee basis. A state can help solve this problem by making a property-
rights ombudsman available to all individuals, which some states 
already do.84 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Post Kelo v. City of New London, it is necessary for individuals 
and state legislators to realize that the protection of Fifth Amendment 
rights is now in their hands. I have detailed three steps states can take 
to help ensure the protection of these rights. Undoubtedly, there are 
other steps states can take. Even though the Supreme Court upheld 
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, there is no reason 
 
 82. Although the Kelo decision focused on the public use clause, the just compensation 
clause could also be considered when drafting a legislative response to Kelo. See Talley, supra 
note 45, at 760–68. Evidence suggests typical fair market values under-compensate homeowners 
displaced by eminent domain; the Supreme Court has even admitted this problem exists. United 
States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 414 U.S. 506 (1979); Talley, supra note 50, at 766 (citing James 
G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 
1277, 1305 (1985). For an illustration of this phenomenon, look no further than the valuation 
figures currently estimated for the Deepdale golf course in New York mentioned at the 
beginning of this commentary; the county assessor’s valuation figure was around $13 million, the 
club insisted it was worth more than $100 million. 
 83. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677. (O’Connor, J. dissenting); Id. at 2687. (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 84. For instance, Utah already has a Property Rights Ombudsman office. 
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why legislatures cannot take steps to protect the Fifth Amendment 
private property rights of their citizens in a meaningful way. 
 
